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AISB event Bulletin Item

CALL FOR PAPERS: Reasons: Action, Belief, Perception, 10-12 Oct 2013, Saarbruecken, GERMANY

Conference Reasons: Action, Belief, Perception
in Saarbrcken, Germany, October 10-12, 2013

Invited speakers:

Terence Cuneo (Vermont)

Gerhard Ernst (Erlangen)

Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck)

Asbjrn Steglich-Petersen (Aarhus)

The aim of the conference is to bridge the gap between reasons in action 
theory/ethics and reasons in epistemology, particularly with respect to the 
distinction between motivating and normative reasons. Main questions are: What 
do reasons for actions and reasons for belief have in common? Are reasons of 
both kinds normative or motivating or explanatory in the same sense? What can 
be learned from reasons of the one kind for understanding reasons of the other 
kind, for example with respect to their ontology? Are reasons of both kinds 
facts, states of affairs, or propositions? If there are normative reasons for 
belief, are they evidence, truth-makers, mental states, or their contents? Can 
our understanding of reasons for belief be improved by transferring the 
conceptual apparatus of action theory to epistemology (or the other way 
around)? Could distinctions from action theory be fruitfully put to work in the 
debate between intentionalism and disjunctivism in the epistemology of

Call for papers:

We invite papers for talks of up to 30 minutes, followed by 30 minutes of 
discussion. Deadline is March 31st 2013.

Strong preference will be given to papers explicitly devoted to connections 
and/or differences between reasons for action and epistemic reasons. Papers 
concerned only with reasons of one of these types will be considered only if 
some open slots cannot be filled otherwise. Please send an abstract with no 
more than 1500 words to Please state your full 
name, address, institutional affiliation, as well as your current status (PhD 
student, post-doc, professor, etc.). Up to seven presentations can be accepted. 
We intend to fill at least half of the slots with speakers in early stages of 
their career, if possible. We will try to acquire some funding for travel and 
accommodation of speakers who cannot raise sufficient funds at their home 
institution, but how much we can do remains to be seen.


Eva Schmidt

Susanne Mantel

Universitt des Saarlandes, Philosophisches Institut,

Supported by the Doctoral Programme of the Philosophy Department (Saarland 
University), the Chair of Philosophy of Mind (Saarland University), and the 
Chair of Practical Philosophy (Saarland University)