Is the external world largely as it appears to be? How can we rule out the 
possibility that we are constantly deceived by a vicious demon or the Matrix? 
In response to the global sceptic, contemporary epistemologists claim - for 
example - that perceptual justification is immediate in that it doesn't require 
independent reason for rejecting sceptical alternatives. Others contend that we 
are a priori entitled to trust "cornerstone" propositions that guarantee the 
reliability of our perceptions. Another view is that ordinary hypotheses are 
preferable to sceptical alternatives because they better explain our 
experiences. All these responses have been challenged with informal and formal 
objections. Bayesian methodology seems to vindicate entitlement theories but it 
is arguably unsuitable to model the state of radical ignorance presupposed by 
the sceptic. Immediate justification theories are affected by gruelling 
difficulties, like the bootstrapping and the cognitive penetrability
  problem. The thesis that explanatory force produces justification is 
controversial and - some contend - incompatible with formal representations of 
rational belief. The workshop focuses on these and other interesting responses 
to external world scepticism. It aims to gather together traditional and formal 
epistemologists to foster collaboration between researchers working from a 
variety of perspectives.

INVITED SPEAKERS:  Berit Brogaard (St Louis), Thomas Grundmann (Cologne), 
Jim Pryor (NYU), Martin Smith (Glasgow), and Ralph Wedgwood (USC)

ORGANIZERS: Luca Moretti (Aberdeen/MCMP), and Lars Weisbrod (MCMP)

We have space for about two additional papers. If you are interested in 
contributing to the workshop, please check the workshop website for further 
information.