DESCRIPTION: 
What role does the assumption of rationality play in communication? Game Theory provides a powerful
tool for investigating this question. If agents are assumed to be perfectly rational, classical 
Game Theory can model linguistic tasks such as pragmatic interpretation as equilibrium calculations.
If agents are assumed to be simple learners, then Evolutionary Game Theory can model the emergence 
of apparently rational signaling systems. However, real language users are neither perfectly 
rational, nor as simple as the agents in evolutionary games. 

This collection aims to explore models of communicative interaction which lie between these 
extremes. We invite submissions which utilize the tools of Game Theory (broadly construed) in 
order to investigate the assumption of rationality (and its limits) in models of communication.

 	DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSIONS: MARCH 31, 2012

 	Notification of Acceptance: May 31, 2012

 	Papers prepared for blind review should be sent to aisaac@sas.upenn.edu 
[mailto:aisaac@sas.upenn.edu]

 	EDITORS:
Alistair Isaac
Department of Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania

 	Sven Lauer
Department of Linguistics
Stanford University